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Comment
LIKE, COMMENT, OR SUBSCRIBE—UNLESS YOU ARE A PRISONER:
HOW PRISONERS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE THWARTED FOR
PENOLOGICAL INTERESTS
“The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress
unlawful speech.”1
JEROME SHAEN*
I.

BE IT A MYSPACE PAGE OR A PAGE IN GAME OF THRONES,
PRISONERS MIGHT NOT HAVE ACCESS2

In the age of technology, social media is an instantaneous forum to share
information, ideas, and beliefs of any kind.3 As of September 2020, 1.82 billion
people log onto Facebook every day and use the site to share photos, post life
updates, and stay in touch with friends and family.4 Instagram alone has over 854
million users—almost three times the number of citizens of the United States.5
Understandably, the social media realm has become a legally protected space to
exercise First Amendment rights—unless you are incarcerated.6
In June 2020, authorities placed Michael Cohen, President Trump’s former
attorney, back in prison after he refused to sign a Federal Location Monitoring

* J.D. Candidate 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.B.A. 2019,
College of William & Mary. This Comment is dedicated to my parents, Michael and Linda, whose
relentless support and affinity for generosity, care, and selflessness inspired me to attend law school
and become a lawyer. I would also like to thank the staff of the Villanova Law Review for sticking
with this piece through many rounds of editing and brainstorming. “Think before you speak. Read
before you think.” Fran Lebowitz, Tips for Teens, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 1, 1979).
1. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002).
2. See Banning Books in Prisons, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://eji.org/news/banning-books-in-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/XQN5-K34D] [hereinafter
Banning Books in Prisons] (reporting how courts have given authority to prison officials to censor
reading materials, but many states have arbitrary policies that exclude books including the Game of
Thrones series).
3. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (discussing positive uses of
social media which include the ability to immediately find information and discuss it with others).
4. Dan Noyes, The Top 20 Valuable Facebook Statistics, ZEPHORIA (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-facebookstatistics/#:~:text=1.82%20billion%20people% 20on%20average,billion%20DAU%20for%20D
ecember%202019 [https://perma.cc/C9GQ-87BV].
5. Jasmin Enberg, GLOBAL INSTAGRAM USERS 2020 (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.emarketer.com/content/global-instagram-users-2020
[https://perma.cc/5UXAYGMQ].
6. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (“In sum, to foreclose access to social media altogether
is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights.”); see also
Aguiar v. Recktenwald, 649 F. App’x 293, 295 (3rd Cir. 2016) (ruling that a prison had a legitimate
penological interest to support deactivating an inmate’s social media account).

(89)
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Agreement that included a stipulation prohibiting him from interacting with the
media in any way.7 This condition would prevent Cohen from publishing a book
critical of former President Donald Trump, an intention Cohen shared on social
media.8 While the Southern District of New York deemed this action retaliatory on
the part of the government and more than likely politically motivated, a
representative from the Board of Prisons asserted this was a normal practice.9 Mr.
Cohen suffered a constitutional injury at the hands of the criminal justice system; a
reality that is, unfortunately, commonplace. The COVID-19 Pandemic has
emphasized the confining nature of prison, especially when it comes to
communication.10 Incarcerated individuals across the country feel these effects.
Jerry Metcalf is imprisoned at Thumb Correctional Facility in Michigan. 11 He
wakes up every morning in an eight-by-ten foot cell, with one small window, that he
shares with a cellmate.12 While this has been his routine for twenty-five years, the

7. See Benjamin Weiser & Alan Feuer, Judge Orders Cohen Released, Citing ‘Retaliation’ Over TellAll Book, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/nyregion/michaelcohen-trump-book.html [https://perma.cc/6A5U-ZJJ7] (summarizing how Michael Cohen was
released on furlough for Coronavirus, “[b]ut to remain at home, he was asked to sign a document
that would have barred him from publishing a book during the rest of his sentence.”). Michael
Cohen was serving a three-year sentence after he pled guilty to campaign finance violations and tax
evasion in 2018, all in the course of working with Donald Trump. See id.
8. See id. (stating how the condition would prevent Cohen from engaging with any kind of
media, including print, TV, film, and books, as well as posting on social media). Cohen had been
alluding to a book on his social media for months, including the use of the hashtag
“#WillSpeakSoon” in June 2020. See also Michael Cohen (@MichaelCohen212), TWITTER (June
26, 2020, 6:52 AM), https://twitter.com/michaelcohen212/status/1276468446344208384?s=21
[https://perma.cc/5W9U-LL7X]. The book, Disloyal, was made available on September 8th, 2020.
See also Anastasia Tsioulcas, Trump Fired a 'Faux-Bama,' Michael Cohen Says in Tell-All Memoir,
NATIONAL
PUBLIC
RADIO
(Sept.
7,
2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/07/910550523/trump-fired-a-faux-bama-michael-cohen-allegesin-tell-all-memoir [https://perma.cc/5UBH-XUDR] (detailing the release of Cohen’s book and the
contents).
9. See Cohen v. Barr, 20 Civ. 5614 (AKH), 2020 WL 4250342, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2020)
(ruling that the government’s conduct was retaliatory in response to Cohen’s exercise of his First
Amendment rights); see also Weiser & Feuer, supra note 7 (citing Justin Long, a Board of Prisons
representative, who stated it was not uncommon for prison officials to restrict inmate’s contact
with media).
10. See Mark Rumold, Now More than Ever, Prisoners Should Have Some Access to Social Media,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION
(Mar.
27,
2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/07/910550523/trump-fired-a-faux-bama-michael-cohen-allegesin-tell-all-memoir [https://perma.cc/G6EW-4MM4] (reporting on the effect of the pandemic on
prisons and how it is becoming increasingly difficult to hear prison perspectives with prisoners
limited access to the internet).
11. Jerry Metcalf, No, your Coronavirus Quarantine is not Just Like Being in Prison, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT:
LIFE
INSIDE
(Mar.
25,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/03/25/no-your-coronavirus-quarantine-is-not-justlike-being-in-prison [https://perma.cc/N99K-Y698] (introducing Metcalf in his biographical
byline). Metcalf was convicted in 1996 and is serving a forty-to-sixty-year sentence for seconddegree murder and two years for a weapons felony. Id. In addition to having his work published,
Metcalf volunteers as an aid for those with mental health conditions and trains service dogs for
Paws with a Cause. Id.
12. See id. (summarizing Metcalf’s morning routine in prison).
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last thirteen months have made the little things even more meaningful to Metcalf. 13
The pandemic has made him fearful of a death alone in prison, where the last faces
he sees will be those of prison guards instead of loved ones.14 Accounts of this
nature are becoming increasingly important, especially as COVID-19 turns prisons
into breeding grounds for the virus. 15 Outside correctional facility walls, virtual
communication is essential in the pandemic, especially to say goodbye to loved ones
as they lie dying alone in hospitals and nursing homes. 16 Yet, prison systems in
numerous states limit or completely prohibit access to social media or online
communication of any nature.17
Historically, legislatures continuously grapple with protecting their
constituents, especially victims of crime, while still accounting for the guaranteed
rights of criminals.18 In the 1970’s, starting with New York, many states passed laws
forbidding convicted criminals from sharing the story of their crimes in order to
make a profit.19 These laws were a reaction to the public’s fear that the newly
convicted Son of Sam murderer, David Berkowitz, would profit from publishing
tales of his serial murders.20 While the New York law was challenged and amended,
in many states laws of this nature still stand, prohibiting persons convicted of certain
felonies from profiting from their criminal actions, including the sale of the stories
for a book or movie.21 Beyond this, even if prisoners write books on subject matter

13. See id. (providing insight into what has gotten Metcalf through the pandemic).
14. See id. (explaining why he would like to be anywhere besides prison during the pandemic).
15. See, e.g., Rumold, supra note 10 (emphasizing how the humanitarian crisis prisoners face in
the pandemic calls for first-hand accounts of the conditions they face while incarcerated); Metcalf,
supra note 11 (“And let's be honest, I now live in a death trap.”).
16. See Ken Beckley, My Wife and I Got the Virus. I got the Virus. I got Better. We Had to Say
Goodbye Over FaceTime., THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/09/28/covid-gooodbye-facetime/
[https://perma.cc/2ALG-EEGZ] (detailing how the author had to say goodbye to his wife
suffering from COVID-19 through FaceTime).
17. See Rumold, supra note 10 (summarizing extensive restrictions states place on inmates’
access to internet).
18. See, e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (invalidating a law
that made it a felony for registered sex offenders to use online sites, most of which were social
media sites); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of The New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 122 (1991) (ruling that a law preventing criminals from selling the story of their crime was
too broad).
19. See Cady Drell, How Son of Sam Changed America, ROLLING STONE (July 29, 2016, 7:10 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/how-son-of-sam-changed-america118562/ [https://perma.cc/YR5N-6NRP] (outlining the history of the Son of Sam murders and
introduction of the first Son of Sam law in New York).
20. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 108 (“Berkowitz's chance to profit from his notoriety
while his victims and their families remained uncompensated did not escape the notice of New
York's Legislature. The State quickly enacted the statute at issue . . . .”). David Berkowitz, also
known as the Son of Sam, killed six people between July 1976 and August 1977 in New York City.
See also Drell, supra note 19. Berkowitz would write notes to local tabloids that sensationalized the
murders and many think encouraged Berkowitz to kill again. See id. (summarizing the effect
Berkowitz’s murders had on the tabloid industry). This media frenzy is what pushed the New York
legislature to pass the Son of Sam law at issue in Simon & Schuster. See id. (connecting the
mishandling of the coverage by New York’s tabloids to the legislation passed by New York).
21. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 2020) (outlining the now narrowly defined
parameters by which a convicted felon cannot profit from their crime, including selling the story).
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unrelated to their crime, reimbursement laws may require that they forfeit any profits
to the state for the cost of their incarceration. 22
Developments in access to literature under the First Amendment serve as an
aspirational end result for social media access reform.23 Courts have given prison
officials discretion to censor reading material, yet many states currently have
arbitrary policies that exclude books on civil rights, human rights, and American
history.24 A policy in Wisconsin illustrates such a phenomenon; while inmates
cannot read Ralph Ginzburg’s 100 Years of Lynchings, they do have access to Hitler’s
Mein Kampf.25 As recently as 2019 a Georgia sheriff took books away from inmates
and only allowed them access to selections on the jail book cart in an effort to
“reduce the amount of combustible material” in an inmate’s cell.26 These bans have
extended to literature about mass incarceration and gifted books. 27 Prison systems
have even attempted to restrict the type of online vendors inmates can order books

22. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 800.401−.406 (West 2020) (outlining the Michigan law
that would give the state a cause of action to sue Dawkins for the profits from his book to reimburse
them for the cost of his incarceration); see also Alexandra Alter, A Prisoner Got a Book Deal. Now the
State Wants Him to Pay for His Imprisonment, N.Y. TIMES (February 17, 2018),
https://perma.cc/M2MQ-HVKH (summarizing the case of Curtis Dawkins, a convicted felon
serving a life sentence for murder who wrote a book of short stories).
23. See, e.g., Bobby Allyn, Arizona Prisons Lift Ban On Book About Mass Incarceration, NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO (June 21, 2019, 3:12 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/books/curtisdawkins-graybar-hotel-prisoner-book-deal.html [https://perma.cc/N3AS-G9FD] (reporting a
case where an Arizona prison placed Chokehold: Policing Black Men, a book criticizing the criminal
justice system, on its unauthorized content list for prisoners); Press Release, American Civil
Liberties Union, ACLU Calls on Prison System to Reverse Rule Severely Limiting Access to Books
in Violation of First Amendment (May 31, 2018) [hereinafter ACLU Calls on Prison System],
https://www.aclu-md.org/en/press-releases/aclu-calls-prison-system-reverse-rule-severelylimiting-access-books-violation-first [https://perma.cc/R2L4-FYRZ] (reporting how the ACLU
was challenging a Maryland DOC regulation that ban prisoners from receiving gifted books from
online vendors other than two private choices); Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union,
South Carolina Jail Agrees to End Unconstitutional Censorship (Jan. 10, 2012) [hereinafter South
Carolina Jail Agrees], https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/south-carolina-jail-agrees-endunconstitutional-censorship [https://perma.cc/CX5W-N2RY] (summarizing the end of a South
Carolina prison regulation that bans any publication bound by staples or including nudity of any
kind); Shelby Copeland, ACLU Says Georgia Sheriff is Illegally Denying Books to Prisoners, CNN (Apr.
11, 2019, 10:51 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/11/us/georgia-county-jail-book-bantrnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/MGB6-M4JL] (reporting how a Georgia sheriff banned books
that arrive to prisoners by mail or from family members, as well as taking books away from
prisoners and only allowing them to read what is on the jail book cart).
24. Banning Books in Prison, supra note 2 (introducing how these book prohibitions came to be).
25. Id. (addressing specific states and the inconsistencies within their lists of banned books).
Compare Ralph Ginzburg, 100 Years of Lynchings (1962) (showing the history of racial atrocities in
America through articles from a range of American newspapers), with Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf
(1925) (detailing Hitler’s manifesto, antisemitism, and his plans for Germany).
26. See Copeland, supra note 23 (“The policy, implemented March 4, not only restricts
incoming books from family, publishers and organizations, but also removes existing books from
inmates. Under this policy, an inmate would only be able to read books from the jail book cart.”).
27. See Allyn, supra note 23 (reporting that the ban of Chokehold: Policing Black Men was
motivated by the possible threat the book posed to order at the prison); see also Copeland, supra
note 23 (reporting how the sheriff banned gifted books as a means to keep combustible materials
out of inmates’ cells as well as control the flow of contraband material).
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from.28 In most of these instances, with the threat of lawsuit, prison systems have
overturned these regulations, calling the legitimacy of the interests behind the
regulations into question.29
Prison systems have intensely regulated prisoners’ access to social media, but
courts have not been as committed to protecting access to these platforms as they
have been with access to literature.30 Cell phones are banned from prisons and many
prisoners only have access to prison regulated email programs. 31 Through these
programs prisoners will engage with proxies, oftentimes a family member, who post
to their social media pages for them.32 These posts maintain meaningful connections
for a prisoner, ultimately aiding reentry into the community after release. 33
Regardless of this positive effect, the courts have deemed the practice unlawful

28. See ACLU Calls on Prison System, supra note 23 (“Citing the First Amendment rights of
prisoners . . . ACLU's National Prison Project (NPP) is calling on the Maryland Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services Recruitment (DOC) to immediately rescind Institutional
Bulletin # 2018-02, which categorically forbids gift books even when sent directly from a seller like
Amazon to those detained in Maryland prisons; forces prisoners to purchase books from one of
two private vendors with extremely limited book offerings; and prohibits any person in custody
from possessing more than 10 books.”).
29. See Allyn, supra note 23 (“An uproar over the ban of Chokehold: Policing Black Men,
including threats of a lawsuit from the American Civil Liberties Union, prompted Arizona prison
officials to review a publication blacklist and reverse suspending the book.”). New Jersey had a
similar ban on Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness
that was also overturned after the ban was questioned by the ACLU. See id. (summarizing the New
Jersey ban that was challenged by the ACLU). Pennsylvania has also been similarly challenged
when the state banned books such as the State Employees’ Retirement Code and a book of Pablo
Picasso paintings, in addition to halting prison donation programs. See id. (summarizing the
challenges the ACLU pitted against Pennsylvania prison regulations). Both of these policies were
revised to more narrowly address the concerns behind them, such as preventing access to
information on how to escape and drug smuggling into state prison facilities. See id. (detailing the
outcome of the ACLU challenges on Pennsylvania prison regulations). See also South Carolina Jail
Agrees, supra note 23 (reporting how a South Carolina prison agreed to settle a lawsuit brought by
the ACLU by dropping a ban on any publication bound by staples or that included nudity). The
ACLU argued that these bans had no penological interest behind them. See id. (quoting David
Shapiro, a staff attorney at ACLU, stating how the systematic prevention of reading by prisoners is
unconstitutional as it is not supported by penological interest).
30. Compare Sisney v. Kaemingk, 469 F. Supp. 3d 903, 918–19 (D.S.D. 2020), appeal docketed,
No. 20-2460 (8th Cir. Jul. 20, 2020) (holding that a pornography policy regulating prison literature
was overinclusive), with Aguiar v. Recktenwald, 649 F. App’x 293, 296 (3rd Cir. 2016) (holding that
a prison was justified in working with a social media site to suspend an inmate’s account).
31. See Seth Ferranti, How Prison Inmates Get on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, VICE (Feb. 11,
2015, 10:11 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bn5qmv/how-convicts-get-on-facebooktwitter-and-instagram-in-prison-211 [https://perma.cc/G5FB-3SNG] (describing the prison
regulated Trust Fund Inmate Computer System or TRULINCS that allows prisoners to exchange
emails with the general public).
32. See id. (outlining how prisoners communicate with a proxy via a prison regulated email
system, who then posts to their social media pages).
33. See id. (“Maintaining family ties can improve the likelihood of a successful reentry into the
community, thus reducing the potential for recidivism.”). Inmate Alex Cook explains:
My mom forwards my emails and I send her my artwork and she takes pictures and posts
them for me. When people comment on my art or just my page, she forwards the messages
for me. It helps me let my friends and family see what I am up to and know that I'm doing
something productive.
Id.
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because of the burden it may place on prisons to monitor this activity.34 Yet, prisons
have still found ways to monitor these activities, especially in an effort to segregate
inmates into security risk groups pretrial. 35 Meanwhile, in areas tangential to the
prison system, such as parole or at-home monitoring agreements, the courts have
ruled that a complete ban on interaction with social media runs contrary to the First
Amendment.36
These regulations placed on prisoners’ First Amendment rights are draconian.
This Comment will argue that overzealous structures of punishment affect broad
regulations that infringe upon the First Amendment rights of incarcerated persons,
especially as applied to their ability to publish works and access social media. While
courts offer protection for access to reading materials, incarcerated persons’ ability
to publish works and access social media has not experienced such a revolution.
Part II explains the legal standard courts use to determine whether these regulations
infringe upon prisoners’ First Amendment rights, as well as Supreme Court cases
protecting convicted criminals’ First Amendment rights. Part III discusses recent
relevant statutes and cases exploring prisoner’s ability to publish works and social
media regulation in correctional facilities. Part IV argues that broad regulations of
social media use and profit forfeiture relating to convict-written material violate a
prisoner’s First Amendment rights and are counterintuitive to the goals of
rehabilitation. Additionally, part IV posits that social media access should be
protected as robustly as access to literature. Finally, part V discusses the impact of
these regulations and how they will continue if not reformed.
II. I’VE BEEN SCROLLING THROUGH PRECEDENT FOR HOURS: HOW THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IMPLICATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Courts have analyzed challenges to First Amendment regulations in prison
systems methodically, depending on the context of the situation. 37 The First

34. See Aguiar, 649 F. App’x at 295 (summarizing the legitimate penological interest prisons
have in preventing unmonitored communications by prisoners).
35. See Benway v. Aldi, No. 3:19-cv-208 (VAB), 2020 WL 4433561, at *1 (D. Conn. July 30,
2020) (summarizing how a prisoner’s Facebook page was assessed in determining his points to
qualify for a Security Risk Group Designation); see also Caves v. Payne, No. 3:20-cv-15 (KAD), 2020
WL 1676916, at *1 (D. Conn. April 6, 2020) (introducing the facts of the case that state the detainee
was placed into segregation due to the Security Risk Group assessment of posts on his Facebook
page).
36. See, e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (holding that a North
Carolina law criminalizing registered sex offenders interacting with social media sites was a violation
of the First Amendment as social media is one of the most prevalent modern ways to express those
rights); Cohen v. Barr, 20 Civ. 5614 (AKH), 2020 WL 4250342, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2020)
(ruling that a complete ban on interacting with the media as a condition of an at-home prison stay
was a violation of plaintiff’s first amendment rights); Manning v. Powers, 281 F.Supp.3d 953, 960–
61 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that the plaintiff would likely be successful in challenging a complete
ban on interacting with social media sites in a parole agreement on First Amendment grounds).
37. See, e.g., Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736 (2017) (applying a strict scrutiny Due Process
analysis to a law concerning registered sex offenders access to social media and the internet more
generally); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of The New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss6/5

6

Shaen: Like, Comment, Or Subscribe—Unless You Are A Prisoner: How Prison

2021]

COMMENT

95

Amendment analysis of prison regulations changes, and separate standards apply
depending on whether the restricted person is a currently incarcerated or a formerly
incarcerated person. 38 Ultimately, these cases illustrate how the courts cannot ignore
the First Amendment rights of prisoners. 39
This section discusses key cases in which the Supreme Court has performed
First Amendment inquiries regarding speech restrictions levied against people
convicted of crimes. First, in Turner v. Safley,40 the Court found that a lesser standard
applied to constitutional challenges of prison regulations than challenges to statutes
and regulations governing non-incarcerated persons.41 Second, the Supreme Court
applied a strict scrutiny analysis to a law affecting criminals authoring works in or
out of prison in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of The New York State Crime Victims
Bd..42 This is the Due Process analysis used for regulation of First Amendment
rights.43 In Packingham v. North Carolina,44 applying an intermediate scrutiny standard,
the Court ruled on a law banning social media use by convicted sex offenders. 45
More importantly in this case, the Court discusses the importance of social media
and the internet, especially to those who have been sanctioned by the criminal justice
system and need to reacclimate to released life.46 These cases build the foundation
of arguments for broader First Amendment privileges in prisons, especially access
to social media.
A. Turner v. Safley: A Jailee’s Rights Only Extend So Far As to Not Burden the
Jailor
The Supreme Court developed the analysis for constitutional challenges to
prison regulations in Turner v. Safley.47 Turner involved a challenge to two Missouri

105, 118 (1991) (applying a strict scrutiny Due Process analysis of a law governing criminal’s ability
to sell the stories of their crimes); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987) (showing how the
court created a new standard of analysis for prison regulations concerning constitutional rights).
38. See, e.g., Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736 (applying a Due Process analysis to a law regulating
released sex offenders and the internet); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118 (applying a Due Process
analysis to criminals, in or out of prison, and their ability to profit from sharing the story of their
crimes); Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (creating a lesser standard of scrutiny to be applied to prison
regulations of constitutional rights).
39. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736 (finding that access to social media and internet accounts
should not be broadly regulated for anyone, including sex offenders); see also Simon & Schuster, 502
U.S. at 118 (finding that laws could not disincentivize speech on crime).
40. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
41. See id. at 89–91 (applying rulings of other prison regulations, the Court creates a new test
to assess the validity of such policies).
42. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
43. See id. at 105–118 (quoting Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1987)) (“In order to justify such differential treatment, ‘the State must show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.’”).
44. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
45. See id. at 1736 (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486 (2014)) (“In order to
survive intermediate scrutiny, a law must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest.’”).
46. See id.
47. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90–91 (1987) (creating a new standard of analysis for
prison regulations based on previous case precedent and the factors used within each to make a
determination).
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Division of Corrections’ prison regulations. 48 First, prisoners were only allowed to
communicate with inmates at other facilities if they were immediate family members
or if the correspondence concerned legal matters. 49 Otherwise, the correspondence
needed to be assessed by prison officials. 50 Second, prison inmates could only marry
at the discretion of the prison superintendent’s finding of “compelling reasons to
do so.”51
The Eighth Circuit, applying a strict scrutiny analysis, found that both
regulations violated respondents’ constitutional rights.52 The Supreme Court
overruled this decision, holding that a lesser standard should apply--the reasonable
relationship test.53 Using the reasonable relationship test, the Court upheld the
regulation on correspondence, yet invalidated the marriage regulation. 54
In formulating the reasonable relationship test, the Court considered Procunier
v. Martinez,55 as the lower court did, which stated that the courts must recognize the
constitutional claims of prisoners.56 However, the Court recognizes that it must
exercise judicial restraint, as the power to regulate these prisons--as well as the power
to allocate resources to them--falls under the role of the executive and legislative
branches.57 Previous precedent ultimately called for an analysis of whether the
regulation was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests or an

48. See id. at 81.
49. See id. at 81–82 (summarizing the permitted correspondence between inmates under the
regulation).
50. See id. (quoting App. 34) (summarizing the regulation’s guidelines for permitting other
types of correspondence outside of the two allowed types, stating, “the classification/treatment
team of each inmate deems it in the best interest of the parties involved”). The Court goes on to
acknowledge trial testimony that showed this determination was based on the inmate’s records,
such as conduct violations and psychological reports, rather than each piece of mail. See id.
51. See id. at 82 (quoting App. 47) (summarizing the marriage regulation). The Court goes on
to recognize that there is no standard to identify “compelling,” and the only testimony of its
application was in the case of pregnancy or birth of an illegitimate child. See id. The previous
regulation did not require the assistance of prison officials in such a marriage, but it also did not
require the superintendent to prohibit marriages. See id.
52. See id. at 81 (“The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, applying a strict scrutiny
analysis, concluded that the regulations violate respondents' constitutional rights.”).
53. See id. (holding the Eighth Circuit erred in applying a strict scrutiny analysis because “a
lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate in determining the constitutionality of the prison rules”).
The Court stated that subjecting everyday decisions of prison officials to a strict scrutiny standard
would harm their ability to create solutions to security risks. See id. at 89.
54. See id. at 81 (“Applying [the lesser] standard, we uphold the validity of the correspondence
regulation, but we conclude that the marriage restriction cannot be sustained.”)
55. 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974).
56. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84–85 (citing Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405–06 ) (summarizing the
opening principles of Martinez). Martinez focused on two principles: federal courts must recognize
valid constitutional claims of prisoners and courts are ill equipped to deal with the problems of
prison leadership and security. See id. (citing Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405–06).
57. See id. at 84-85 (“Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires
expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the
province of the legislative and executive branches of government. Prison administration is,
moreover, a task that has been committed to the responsibility of those branches, and separation
of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.”).
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exaggerated response to such concerns.58 Using these same cases, the Court
established the four-part reasonable relationship test to analyze these claims: 1)
whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the
governmental interest; 2) whether there are alternate means to express this right
available to the prison inmates; 3) whether the impact accommodating the right will
have on prison guards and fellow inmates; and 4) whether the absence of alternatives
suggests the reasonableness of the regulation. 59
B.

Write What You Know, Unless it’s a Crime: Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
The New York State Crime Victims Bd.

Son of Sam laws aim to prevent criminals from profiting from media—such as
books, shows, and movies—about their crimes.60 The history of such laws begins
in the late 1970s when New York was terrorized by renowned serial killer, the Son
of Sam; speculation arose that the killer, David Berkowitz, was going to sell the
story.61 The state passed a law (known colloquially as “The Son of Sam Law”) in
response to these rumors, requiring that any entity contracting with a criminal for
the depiction of their crime must notify the New York State Crime Victims Board
and turn over any income earned to be held available as a remedy in a potential civil
suit brought by victims or their families. 62 The statute was so broad as to include
any person who had entered a guilty plea or been convicted of a crime, as well as
any person who voluntarily and intelligently confessed to a crime for which they
were not prosecuted.63

58. See id. at 87 (surmising from four cases identified—Pell, Jones, Bell, Block—that “the Court
. . . instead inquired whether a prison regulation that burdens fundamental rights is ‘reasonably
related’ to legitimate penological objectives, or whether it represents an ‘exaggerated response’ to
those concerns”). The Court first discusses Pell v. Procunier, in which a regulation banned inmates
from partaking in face-to-face media interviews. See id. at 86 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
827 (1974)). The Court rejected the challenge in this case, stating that prison officials have expert
judgement that should be deferred to, especially there is no evidence showing that the regulation is
an exaggerated response. See id. Next, the Court looks to Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union, in
which regulations prohibited many of the normal functions of a union. See id. Again and, again,
the Court rejected the challenge as the regulation was rationally related to the objectives of prison
administration. See id. (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977)).
In Bell v. Wolfish, the regulation banned receipt of hardback books unless they were sent directly
from the seller. See id. at 87 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 550 (1979)). Once again, the
Court found the regulation was a rational response and it should defer to prison administrators.
See id. at 87 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 550–51). Finally, in Block v. Rutherford, the Court upheld a ban
on physical visits as the sound discretion of prison officials determined it would jeopardize prison
security and that the regulation was reasonably related to such. See id. (citing Block v. Rutherford,
468 U.S. 576, 589, 586 (1984)).
59. See id. at 89–90 (summarizing new four-factor analysis based on precedent from Pell, Jones,
Bell, and Block).
60. Sandra Thomas, Son of Sam Laws, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA (2009),
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1242/son-of-sam-laws
[https://perma.cc/TE7G-GPAV] (explaining the basics of Son of Sam Laws).
61. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of The New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 108 (1991) (summarizing history of the law at issue in the case).
62. See id. at 109–10 (connecting the history of the law to what the law prohibits); see also N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 2020).
63. See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 110 (“Subsection (10) broadly defines ‘person
convicted of a crime’ to include ‘any person convicted of a crime in this state either by entry of a
plea of guilty or by conviction after trial and any person who has voluntarily and intelligently
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The case arose when the publishing company Simon & Schuster contracted
with mobster Henry Hill to publish and sell an autobiographical book on his life.64
The book, Wiseguy, outlined the day-to-day life of Hill, and detailed many of the
crimes he committed.65 The Crime Victims Board notified Simon & Schuster about
violating the Son of Sam law, informing the company that it must turn over all
amounts owed to Hill, and Hill was to surrender any payments already made. 66
Simon & Schuster brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim, seeking a declaration that
the law violated the First Amendment.67
Applying a strict scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court ruled that the law was
inconsistent with the First Amendment.68 Following prior precedent, the Court held
that a statute violates the First Amendment when it places a financial burden on an
individual because of the content of their speech. 69 When a statute infringes upon
a fundamental right, like any First Amendment right, the state can pass strict scrutiny
only by justifying said statute with a legitimate state interest the statute advances. 70
Additionally, the statute must be narrowly tailored to address such an interest. 71
While New York had a legitimate interest in compensating the victims of these
crimes, it did not have any interest in limiting such proceeds to that which arose
from speech on crime.72 Even with this legitimate interest, the inclusion of works
on any subject—so long as it relates to the author’s thoughts or recollections on his
crime—as well as any person who had allegedly committed a crime—prosecuted or

admitted the commission of a crime for which such person is not prosecuted.’”) (quoting N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 632-a(10)(b) (McKinney 2020)).
64. See id. at 111.
65. See id. at 112–13. Hill’s crime organized crime career spanned 25 years, with most of said
crimes being mundane such as extortion, importing and distributing narcotics, and numerous
robberies. See id. However, he masterminded some of the largest crimes of his time, including the
1978–1979 Boston College basketball point-shaving scandal and the organized theft of six million
dollars from Lufthansa Airlines. See id. Hill was arrested in 1980, yet obtained immunity as he
testified in the trials of many of his colleagues. See id. At the time of writing his book, Hill was in
the Federal Witness Protection Program under an assumed name. See id. The book accounts in
first-person narrative Hill’s daily activities over this career and the crimes he committed. See id.
66. See id. 114–15 (summarizing the events that occurred after the Crime Victims Board
became aware of the situation and reviewed Hill’s contract with Simon & Schuster).
67. See id. at 115 (introducing the procedural history of the case). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 created a civil cause of action designed to address constitutional deprivations and
enforce constitutional rights.
68. See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 123.
69. See id. at 115 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)). The Court found this
principle so innate in the First Amendment that it does not require explanation. See id. at 115–16
(citing Leathers, 499 U.S. at 447).
70. See id. at 118 (“In order to justify such differential treatment, ‘the State must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.’” (quoting Ark.Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)).
71. See id. at 121 (stating that the Court must analyze if the law is narrowly tailored to address
the interest in compensating victims of crime).
72. See id. at 120–21 (“In short, the State has a compelling interest in compensating victims
from the fruits of the crime, but little if any interest in limiting such compensation to the proceeds
of the wrongdoer's speech about the crime.”).
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not—made the statute overinclusive and not narrowly tailored to address this
interest.73
C. Packingham v. North Carolina: Access to Social Media is a First Amendment
Right, Even for Registered Sex Offenders
In 2008, North Carolina passed a law that made it a felony for registered sex
offenders to access social media sites where minor children could have a presence. 74
After the petitioner was convicted in state court of violating this statute, he
petitioned for certiorari, challenging the law on First Amendment grounds. 75
Highlighting the importance of social media to previously incarcerated individuals
and recognizing the unbounded limits of cyberspace, the Court called for narrow
restrictions on social media access, as “what [the courts] say today might be obsolete
tomorrow.” 76
Applying an intermediate scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court invalidated the
statute.77 Under intermediate scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to address a
significant government interest.78 While North Carolina had an interest in
protecting possible victims of such crimes, it did not prove that such a sweeping law
was necessary to further that interest.79 The Court held it would be possible to create
a statute that more narrowly targets illicit conduct on the internet as opposed to
banning access to most internet sites completely.80
Additionally, the Court expanded on the importance of social media and the
internet.81 The Court stated that the law “bars access to what for many are the
principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment,
speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast
realms of human thought and knowledge.”82 To do so prevents an individual from
accessing “the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his

73. See id. at 121 (proffering the law is overinclusive as it covers any subject as long as it details
the author’s story of their crime, as well as including any person who has committed a crime
whether they have been prosecuted or not).
74. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (2017) (introducing the issue that
gave rise to the case). The law gave a four-part test to determine which sites fell under this law:
operated by a person who garners revenue from membership fees, ad sales, or other sources for
operation of such site; facilitates interaction between two individuals for the purposes of friendship;
allows users to create personal profiles; and provides users with the mechanisms to communicate
with each other. See id. at 1733–34 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14–202.5(a)–(b), (e) (West
2015)).
75. See id. at 1734–35 (summarizing the procedural history of the case).
76. Id. at 1735–36.
77. Id. at 1738.
78. Id. at 1736 (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486 (2014)).
79. Id. at 1737.
80. See id. (“Though the issue is not before the Court, it can be assumed that the First
Amendment permits a State to enact specific, narrowly tailored laws that prohibit a sex offender
from engaging in conduct that often presages a sexual crime, like contacting a minor or using a
website to gather information about a minor.”).
81. Id. at 1735 (“While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most
important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is
cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’ in general, and social media in particular.”
(quoting Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997))).
82. Id. at 1737 (emphasizing the First Amendment speech the law is prohibiting).
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or her voice heard.” 83 Most pertinently, the Court discussed the benefits a convicted
criminal can have from accessing networking sites of this nature: “Even convicted
criminals—and in some instances especially convicted criminals—might receive
legitimate benefits from these means for access to the world of ideas, in particular if
they seek to reform and to pursue lawful and rewarding lives.”84 The Court
emphasizes that social media is part of a revolution in thought occurring in
cyberspace, and because it is uncertain how this revolution may proceed, the Court
should be cautious about rulings that may prove quickly obsolete.85 With this in
mind, the Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment needs to adapt as
speech does, stating that it must be cautious before providing scant protection to
the internet as it fosters this arena for new realizations. 86
III. THE COURTS ‘COMMENT’ ON FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS FOR
PRISONERS, BUT THEY ONLY ‘LIKE’ SOME OF THEM
In the past five years, incarcerated people have experienced inconsistent
developments in the protection of their First Amendment rights. 87 Most recently,
in Sisney v. Kaemingk,88 inmates achieved success when challenging a South Dakota
Board of Corrections pornography policy that prohibited any literature with sexual
content or that depicted nudity, including works of art.89 This decision reflects the
modern understanding of the First Amendment and how it applies to prisons. 90
While the courts are willing to recognize how the First Amendment is changing,
especially in the context of the internet, there is still a disconnect in the application

83. Id. (arguing the weight of the forum that the internet provides).
84. Id. (arguing the importance of the internet to convicted criminals, especially as they readapt
to everyday life).
85. Id. at 1736.
86. See id. (“This case is one of the first this Court has taken to address the relationship
between the First Amendment and the modern Internet. As a result, the Court must exercise
extreme caution before suggesting that the First Amendment provides scant protection for access
to vast networks in that medium.”).
87. Compare Aguiar v. Recktenwald, 649 F. App’x 293, 295 (3d Cir. 2016) (upholding the
prison’s deactivation of a prisoner’s social media account), with Cohen v. Barr, 20 Civ. 5614 (AKH),
2020 WL 4250342, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2020) (holding that a complete bar on interaction with
the media in a Federal Location Monitoring Agreement did not address the true penological
interests of the government), and Manning v. Powers, 281 F. Supp. 3d 953, 960–61 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
(holding that the plaintiff would likely be successful in challenging a complete ban on interacting
with social media sites in a parole agreement on First Amendment grounds).
88. 469 F. Supp. 3d 903 (D.S.D. 2020).
89. See id. at 918–19 (holding that a complete ban on any publications with nudity was too
broad, infringing upon prisoner’s First Amendment rights).
90. See Christine D. Truter, Comment, First Amendment Rights of Prisoners: Freedom of the Prison
Press, 18 U.S.F.L. REV. 599, 600 (1984) (explaining how after the erosion of the hands-off doctrine
with prisons and censorship, the Supreme Court ruled that prisoners do retain their First
Amendment rights in Pell v. Procunier) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
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of these changes.91 Amended Son of Sam laws and reimbursement laws still prevent
inmates from keeping any future profits from telling not only the story of their
crimes but any story at all.92 Prisoners furloughed to at-home sentences or released
criminals on parole have won challenges to complete bans on their access to social
media, yet prison inmates are still blocked or discouraged from sharing their ideas
and beliefs in this forum.93
A. One New Like: Court Expands Prisoners Access to Literature in Sisney v.
Kaemingk
Sisney v. Kaemingk illuminates the modern understanding of the First
Amendment and how it applies to incarcerated persons. In this case, the court
overturned a prison pornography policy that broadly restricted the types of literature
prisoners could read. 94 It reviewed the policy in light of Turner as well as recent
precedent that discussed disqualifying characteristics for reading material. 95
Ultimately, the court held that the policy was an exaggerated response to the prison’s
concerns.96
In June 2020, the District Court of South Dakota found that the Department
of Corrections pornography policy violated the U.S. Constitution. 97 The policy
prohibited inmates from buying, possessing, or attempting to possess pornographic
material.98 Pornographic material was defined as any literature that included nudity
or sexually explicit conduct, as well as depictions of nudity or sexually explicit
conduct.99 Nudity was defined as “a pictorial or other graphic depiction where male

91. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (summarizing the
revolution of the Cyber Age and the need for courts to be considerate in what they say regarding
such, as it may become quickly obsolete).
92. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 2020) (reflecting the amendments to New
York’s Son of Sam law to show how it stands today); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 800.401–406
(West 2020) (showing Michigan’s reimbursement law, which calls any windfall a prisoner may come
into as a means to pay for incarceration); Alter, supra note 22 (showing the application of Michigan’s
reimbursement law on an inmate who wrote a book of short stories unrelated to his crime); Steven
P. Vargas, Comment, New York's Son of Sam Law: Alive and Well Today, 11 TOURO L. REV. 629, 646
(1995) (stating that New York’s Son of Sam law was revised to remove the constitutional blemishes
the Supreme Court identified in Simon & Schuster).
93. See, e.g., Cohen, 2020 WL 4250342, at *1 (barring media ban in an at-home sentence
agreement); Manning, 281 F. Supp. at 960–61 (barring social media ban in parole agreement);
Aguiar, 649 F. App’x at 295 (allowing prison deactivation of a social media account).
94. Sisney v. Kaemingk, 469 F. Supp. 3d 903, 918–19 (D.S.D. 2020).
95. See id. at 911–12, 916–17 (analyzing the prison’s pornography policy in light of the Turner
analysis and a recent case that was more intentional about analyzing reading material broadly).
96. See id. at 917.
97. See id. at 919 (finding merit in plaintiff’s constitutional as applied and facial challenges to
the prison regulation).
98. See id. at 910 (quoting the regulation at issue, which “prohibits the purchase, possession
and attempted possession and manufacturing of pornographic material by offenders in its
institutions”).
99. See id. (quoting the definition of pornographic material in the regulation that “[i]ncludes
books, articles, pamphlets, magazines, periodicals, or any other publications or materials that
feature nudity or ‘sexually explicit’ conduct” and “may also include books, pamphlets, magazines,
periodicals or other publications or material that features, or includes photographs, drawings,
etchings, paintings, or other graphic depictions of nudity or sexually explicit material”).
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or female genitalia, pubic area, buttocks or female breasts are exposed.” 100 The
definition of sexually explicit encapsulated this definition of nudity and expanded
the prohibited materials even further. 101 Charles Sisney, an inmate within the South
Dakota Department of Corrections, made both as-applied and facial challenges to
this policy because the prison rejected his delivery of seven publications and nine
pictures while he was incarcerated.102
The District Court applied the Turner analysis to both challenges.103 As applied,
the court ruled that the pornography policy was not related to a penological interest,
except in two instances: where the content was overtly sexual or could play to the
“prurient interests” of certain offenders.104 Second, there were no reasonable
alternative means by which prisoners could exercise these First Amendment
rights.105 The court acknowledged that the prison could tailor content restrictions
based on each individual prisoner’s conviction.106 However, the court did not expect

100. Id. Additionally, the policy exempts “[p]ublished material containing nudity illustrative
of medical, educational or anthropological content . . . .” Id.
101. See id. at 910–11 (quoting the definition of sexually explicit in the regulation, which
“includes written and/or pictorial, graphic depiction of actual or simulated sexual acts, including
but not limited to sexual intercourse, oral sex or masturbation” and “also includes individual
pictures, photographs, drawings, etchings, writings or paintings of nudity or sexually explicit
conduct that are not part of a book, pamphlet, magazine, periodical or other publication.”).
102. See id. at 910 (summarizing the grounds for the case). Sisney was rejected delivery of
Pretty Face Manga Comics, Volumes 3, 4, 5, 6, Thrones of Desire, Pride and Prejudice: The Wild and Wanton
Edition, and Matisse, Picasso and Modern Art in Paris. See id. The photos Sisney was denied access
to were Paradise by Michelangelo, The Expulsion from the Garden by Michelangelo which is painted
on the Sistine Chapel ceiling, Statue of David by Michelangelo, Bronze The Creation of Adam and Eve
by Lorenzo Ghiberti, The Fall and Expulsion from the Garden of Eden by Michelangelo, which is also
depicted on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, Study of the Resurrection of the Dead by Michelangelo, and
Paradise Bronze by Michelangelo. See id.
103. See id. at 911 (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 403 (1989); Bahrampour v.
Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2004)) (“Turner analysis is applicable to both as applied and
facial challenges.”).
104. See id. (“The pornography policy is related to a governmental objective, but not
reasonably so except in the instances of Manga Comics and Coppertone.”). For the as-applied
challenge, the Turner factors were applied to each item. See id. Under the third Turner factor
analyzing the impact of assertion of the constitutional right, the court ruled that the Manga Comics
include sexual themes that would give them value to be bartered, as well as have an adverse effect
on female employees. See id. Under the second Turner factor analyzing other means to exercise
these rights, the court acknowledged it would be too much of a burden for prisons to evaluate each
inmate and provide access based on profile which is most pertinent to the Coppertone ad. See id.
The Coppertone ad depicts the cuteness of a child that would pique the “prurient interests” of
child sex offenders. See id. at 913. While these criminals are a minority in the prison, the penological
interests concerning them must override the constitutional interests of the majority of the prison.
See id. Ultimately, the regulation was not deemed an exaggerated response when applied to either
of these publications. See id. at 912.
105. See id. at 911–12 (“As for the second factor, there is no alternate means by which
prisoners can exercise their First Amendment rights . . . .”).
106. See id. at 912. In its Turner analysis, the court found:
As for the second factor, there is no alternate means by which prisoners can exercise their
First Amendment rights unless prisoners were evaluated individually and provided access
according to their profile. For example, prisoners inclined to violence would get no vio
lence related materials. See Murchison v. Rogers, 779 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2015) (single issue
of Newsweek magazine banned to all the prison population for its strong depiction of

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss6/5

14

Shaen: Like, Comment, Or Subscribe—Unless You Are A Prisoner: How Prison

2021]

COMMENT

103

this level of specificity from prison administrators. 107 Third, the court stated that it
was difficult to identify any burden that accommodating these rights would have
created for others in the prison. 108 Finally, the court identified a possible alternative
to this regulation based on a prior case. 109 The District Court had previously
validated a policy that allowed a publication to be judged in its entirety, rather than
just its parts—such as a specific page—that may be prohibited.110 Based on this
alternative, the court ruled that the pornography policy was an exaggerated response
to prison concerns, except in the two exceptions previously mentioned. 111
For the facial challenge, the court focused on the inclusion of nudity in the
policy and its definitions.112 Simple nudity, as the court called it, is not sexually
explicit conduct.113 By removing the word nudity from the definition of sexually
explicit as well as pornographic material, the policy would pass the Turner analysis.114
Next, the court applied Turner to invalidate the prohibition of depictions of simple
nudity, stating that there is no legitimate penological interest to support such a
ban. 115 Finally, the court further stated that banning the written word of sexual

gang
violence). Child sex offenders would not get Coppertone type ads or other similar materials.
See id. at 911–12.
107. See id. at 912 (“Although such specific limitations are possible, it is not reasonable for the
courts to require that level of specificity from prison administrators.”).
108. See id. (acknowledging the difficulty in imagining any burden being created through the
exercise of this right, except in the case of the Manga Comics and the Coppertone ad which have
bartering value).
109. See id. (asserting the application of the policy the court adopted previously as one possible
alternative to this regulation, that has not been departed from).
110. See id. at 911 (citing King v. Dooley, 4:00-cv-04052-LLP, No. 34 (D.S.D. June 16, 2003))
(summarizing the policy the court upheld in King). In King, the policy looked at what the book
featured. See id. This definition of “features” considered the entire book, not just a single page,
and would not ban a book if material could be prurient, but was not, and only contributed to the
greater narrative. See id.
111. See id. at 912 (asserting the existence of alternative means of regulation, including one
ruled on by the court, when the court found the policy to be an exaggerated response as applied).
112. See id. at 916 (analyzing the use of nudity, as defined outside of what is sexually explicit
material).
113. See id. (“Sexually explicit conduct is far removed from simple nudity.”).
114. See id. Again, applying the Turner analysis, the court stated:
As for the factors underlying that ultimate Turner test, the government objective under
lying that portion of the regulations is legitimate and neutral, and that portion of the reg
ulations is rationally related to that government objective only with the removal of nudity
from the definitions of pornographic material and what is sexually explicit.
Id. The court goes on to say that without these deletions, the policy is overly broad and
violates the First Amendment. See id. Additionally, banning a publication because of a single sexual
reference would also qualify as overly broad. See id. For the second factor of the Turner test, the
court acknowledges that there are no alternative means by which a prisoner could view simple
nudity or literature without sexually explicit conduct. See id. at 916–17. Third, to allow sexually
explicit material would have an adverse effect on the prison and its occupants, yet the court still
separates simple nudity and single reference publications from this idea. See id. at 917. Finally, if
the policy banned only sexually explicit material, it would not be an exaggerated response. See id.
115. See id. at 917 (“What then about depictions of simple nudity that is not sexually explicit?
The regulations banning simple nudity which has no component of being sexually explicit as
defined by the policy, has no reasonable relation to any legitimate penological interests.”). Again,
applying the Turner factors in their entirety, the court says that there are no alternative means for
which prisoners can view simple nudity. See id. Third, the court believes there would be no
“discernible impact” on prison occupants and guards. See id. “Finally, the banning of simple nudity,
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content violates the First Amendment.116 There must be a distinction between
publications that feature sexual content as compared to those where sexual content
is merely a part of the publication. 117 Overall, the court ruled that the prison system
must edit the definitions to exclude nudity in order to focus on sexually explicit
material or the policy is overly broad, failing to reasonably relate to the penological
interest behind it, violating the First Amendment.118
B.

Modern Son of Sam Laws and Reimbursement Laws

While the Supreme Court ruled that New York’s Son of Sam law was too broad,
it did not prevent revision of the law to comport with its holding. 119 Today, the law
still stands, albeit with more well-defined parameters.120 New York Executive Law
Section 632-a mandates that any person convicted of a specifically enumerated
crime, whether in prison, on parole, or no longer under sanctions or supervision of
any kind, cannot profit from their crimes.121 The statute now more narrowly defines
the crimes subject to its purview, including violent felonies, class B felonies, any
felony in the first degree, and grand larceny in the fourth degree. 122 The law goes

nudity which has no component of being sexually explicit, is an exaggerated response to prison
concerns.” See id.
116. See id. (emphasizing the gravity of banning the written word of sexual material). See id.
The court states that the King policy did not even go this far to emphasize the severity of the policy
at hand. See id. To have a ban of this magnitude could include rejection of the Bible, many of
Shakespeare’s works, all of the works of John Updike, Philip Roth, Earnest Hemingway, and
Gabriel Garcia Marquez. See id.
117. See id. (“It is a huge leap for the current policy to ban written material with sexual content
where the sexual content is a natural part of the written work as opposed to sexual material being
the feature of the publication.”).
118. See id. (summarizing the holding of the court). The court suggests a pornographic
material definition, without the words “nudity or” before sexually explicit, to be updated as follows
to comply with the First Amendment:
Includes books, articles, pamphlets, magazines, periodicals, or any other publications or ma
terials that feature “sexually explicit” conduct. Pornographic material may also include books,
pamphlets, magazines, periodicals or other publications or material that features photographs,
drawings, etchings, paintings, or other graphic depictions of sexually explicit material. “Fea
ture” means a publication which routinely and regularly featured pornography, or in the case
of one-time issues, promoted itself based on pornographic content. Graphic depictions of
nudity of minors is prohibited.
Id.
119. See Vargas, supra note 92, at 646 (stating how New York edited the Son of Sam law to
comport with the Supreme Court’s ruling it unconstitutional); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of The New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (holding that New
York’s Son of Sam law specifically was overly broad for reasons stated in the opinion and
inconsistent with the constitution).
120. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 2020) (reflecting the revisions made to the law
to not only address the Supreme Court’s concerns, but generally narrow the scope of the
prohibition); see also Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 123 (“The Federal Government and many of the
States have enacted statutes designed to serve purposes similar to that served by the Son of Sam
law.”); Vargas, supra note 92, at 645 (“The revised statute was essentially a three-point response to
the Simon & Schuster, Inc. opinion.”).
121. See EXEC. § 632-a.
122. See id. § 632-a(1)(e)(i) (listing the crimes which fall under the statute). This list includes:
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on to state that any such profits will be escrowed by the state, allowing victims of
the crime to file a civil action for damages within three years of the discovery of such
profits.123 After three years, if no such action commences, the funds will be returned
to the respondent.124
Even if prisoners do not write about their crime, the state can claim any profits
from a book or any windfall that the prisoner may receive.125 Incarceration
reimbursement laws, currently enacted in forty-nine states, allow a state to file an
action against an inmate or former inmate for the cost of their “care,” as the statute
states.126 In 2017, Michigan applied such a law to file suit against Curtis Dawkins. 127
Dawkins, who is currently serving a life sentence in prison, had his collection of
short stories, The Graybar Hotel, published in 2016.128 He had transferred any profits
from the book to his family for his children’s education. 129 However, the Michigan
Treasury Department filed a complaint stating he had no right to do so, in addition

(A) a violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 of the penal law;
(B) a class B felony offense defined in the penal law;
(C) an offense for which a merit time allowance may not be received against the sentence
pursuant to paragraph (d) of subdivision one of section eight hundred three of the correction law;
(D) an offense defined in the penal law that is titled in such law as a felony in the first degree;
(E) grand larceny in the fourth degree as defined in subdivision six of section 155.30 or grand
larceny in the second degree as defined in section 155.40 of the penal law;
(F) criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree as defined in section 165.52
of the penal law; or
(G) an offense in any jurisdiction which includes all of the essential elements of any of the
crimes specified in clauses (A) through (F) of this subparagraph and either the crime victim as
defined in subparagraph (i) of paragraph (d) of this subdivision was a resident of this state at the
time of the commission of the offense or the act or acts constituting the crime occurred in whole
or in part in this state.
Id.
123. See id. § 632-a(3) (“Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of the estates, powers
and trusts law or the civil practice law and rules with respect to the timely bringing of an action,
any crime victim shall have the right to bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to
recover money damages from a person convicted of a crime of which the crime victim is a victim,
or the representative of that convicted person, within three years of the discovery of any profits
from a crime or funds of a convicted person, as those terms are defined in this section.”).
124. See id. § 632-a(7)(b)(iv) (“In the event no claim was filed or judgment obtained prior to
the expiration of the three year statute of limitations, the office shall return the escrowed amount
to the respondent.”).
125. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 800.401-06 (West 2020) (outlining Michigan’s
reimbursement law); see also Alter, supra note 22 (summarizing an instance where a prisoner’s profits
in connection with a book he published were claimed as reimbursement for the cost of his
incarceration).
126. See, e.g., Alter, supra note 22 (“Michigan is one of more than 40 states where prisoners
can be forced to pay for the cost of their incarceration, according to the Brennan Center for Justice
at the New York University School of Law.”); Is Charging Inmates to Stay in Prison Smart Policy?,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/charging-inmates-stay-prison-smart-policy
[https://perma.cc/F7YQ5Y2Y] (showing that 49 states, where data is available, have pay-to-stay laws); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 800.403(2) (West 2020).
127. See Alter, supra note 22 (summarizing the claim filed against Dawkins after an article came
out about him and the book he wrote).
128. See id. (introducing Curtis Dawkins and his situation).
129. See id. (“The book was also a boon for his family: Mr. Dawkins directed the money into
an education fund for his three children.”).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2022

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 6 [2022], Art. 5

106

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE

[Vol. 66

to seeking 90% of his assets, stating his imprisonment cost $372,000 since 2005.130
The Michigan State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act allows the attorney
general to ascertain whether a prisoner can cover either at least 10% of the total cost
of care or 10% of the cost for two years, whichever is less.131 Not more than 90%
of the prisoner’s assets can be used for such costs.132
These statutes have created an overwhelming economic problem in the United
States. In a 2015 Brennan Center for Justice report, researchers found that across
the country ten million people owe $50 million for costs related to their
imprisonment or arrest.133 Michigan, in fiscal year 2017, collected $3.7 million from
only 294 prisoners.134 When poverty disproportionately leads to incarceration, these
policies would only perpetuate recidivism and the high rates of imprisonment in this
country.135 Additionally, criminal conviction makes it difficult to get a job, making
any prospect of revenue coveted by released individuals.136 Even outside of a First
Amendment context, these laws highlight the over-exaggerated, retributivist ideals
of punishment in this country.
C. A Parolee, Political Pariah, and a Prisoner Have Entered the Chat: Which One
Gets Removed?
Michael Cohen’s story further emphasizes how courts are slowly recognizing
a First Amendment right to access social media, especially for those who have
entered the criminal justice system. Courts have been quick to provide injunctions
against complete bans on social media access for Cohen, a convicted felon released
on furlough from prison, as well as other convicted persons on parole.137 While the

130. See id. (summarizing the state’s claim and damages sought against Dawkins).
131. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.403(2) (West 2020) (“If the attorney general upon
completing the investigation under subsection (1) has good cause to believe that a prisoner has
sufficient assets to recover not less than 10% of the estimated cost of care of the prisoner or 10%
of the estimated cost of care of the prisoner for 2 years, whichever is less, the attorney general shall
seek to secure reimbursement for the expense of the state of Michigan for the cost of care of that
prisoner.”). If sufficient funds exist, the attorney general can seek reimbursement. Id. § 800.404(1).
132. See id. § 800.403(3) (“Not more than 90% of the value of the assets of the prisoner may
be used for purposes of securing costs and reimbursement under this act.”).
133. See Alter, supra note 22 summarizing the 2015 amounts owed by persons in this country
who have had contact with the criminal justice system (citing Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Charging Inmates
Perpetuates Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 1 (2015).
134. See id. (“During the last fiscal year, Michigan collected some $3.7 million from 294
prisoners, who account for just a fraction of the state’s nearly 40,000 inmates.”).
135. See Tara O’Neill Hayes & Margaret Barnhorst, Incarceration and Poverty in the United States,
AMERICAN
ACTION
FORUM
(June
30,
2020),
https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/incarceration-and-poverty-in-the-united-states/
(explaining how homelessness, the high price of cash bail, poverty’s connection with substance
abuse, and income inequality lead to imprisonment).
136. See Stephanie Francis Ward, How to Help People with Criminal Records Break Barriers to
Employment, ABA JOURNAL (June 26, 2019),) https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/helpingpeople-with-criminal-records-break-barriers-to-employment (outlining how people with criminal
convictions make up one-third of the adult population in this country, making employers question
the legal implications of hiring these individuals).
137. See infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
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courts have protected these individuals’ social media privileges, even with status
tangential to incarceration, incarcerated persons have not received the same
protections.138
In July 2020, Michael Cohen returned to prison after questioning a condition
of his Federal Location Monitoring Agreement. 139 The condition stated:
No engagement of any kind with the media, including print, TV, film,
books, or any other form of media/news. Prohibition from all social
media platforms. No posting on social media and a requirement that you
communicate with friends and family to exercise discretion in not posting
on your behalf or posting any information about you. The purpose is to
avoid glamorizing or bringing publicity to your status as a sentenced
inmate serving a custodial term in the community.140
Cohen had been released on furlough due to the COVID-19 pandemic and his
health concerns.141 He filed suit, challenging his return to prison as an attempt to
suppress his First Amendment rights because he was writing a book critical of
Donald Trump.142 The judge ruled that his return to confinement was a retaliatory
response to his intentions to publish such a book and discuss it on social media. 143
The judge enjoined the government from further retaliation towards Cohen in his
efforts to exercise his First Amendment rights. 144 After Cohen’s release, the judge
ordered the parties to negotiate the conditions of his release to “be consistent with
the First Amendment and legitimate penological limitations on conduct . . . .” 145
Without applying the Turner factors, the judge ruled that the condition was not
reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest behind it. 146
This is not the first time a federal court has ruled on a release condition of this
nature.147 In 2017, in Manning v. Powers,148 on application for a preliminary injunction,
the Central District of California ruled that the petitioner was likely to succeed on a

138. See infra notes 157-66 and accompanying text.
139. See Weiser & Feuer, supra note 7 (introducing the legal issue surrounding Michael Cohen’s
return to prison); see also Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Files First
Amendment Challenge Against Michael Cohen’s Retaliatory Imprisonment (July 20, 2020)
[hereinafter ACLU Files First Amendment Challenge], https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclufiles-first-amendment-challenge-against-michael-cohens-retaliatory-imprisonment
[https://perma.cc/2TMC-JKWA] (summarizing Cohen’s legal claim when being returned to
prison for questioning his agreement to remain at home for his sentence).
140. ACLU Files First Amendment Challenge, supra note 139.
141. See Weiser & Feur, supra note 7 (summarizing why Cohen was furloughed from prison).
142. See ACLU Files First Amendment Challenge, supra note 139 (detailing the chronology
of events that lead to Cohen’s return to prison).
143. See Cohen v. Barr, 20 Civ. 5614 (AKH), 2020 WL 4250342, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2020)
(“The Court finds that Respondents’ purpose in transferring Cohen from release on furlough and
home confinement back to custody was retaliatory in response to Cohen desiring to exercise his
First Amendment rights to publish a book critical of the President and to discuss the book on social
media.”).
144. See id. (summarizing the remedy for the claim).
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See, e.g., Manning v. Powers, 281 F. Supp. 3d 953, 960-61 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that
a parole condition calling for a social media ban would be overturned on First Amendment
grounds).
148. Id.
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First Amendment challenge to conditions in his parole agreement that forbade use
of social media and messaging sites.149 Applying Packingham, the court recognized
the state’s interest in deterring future criminal conduct and protecting public safety,
yet stated that these interests do not justify such sweeping prohibitions. 150 The court
ruled to enjoin officials from enforcing that condition of the agreement pending trial
of the action.151
However, the courts have not upheld these same rights for prisoners, even with
the expanded understanding of the First Amendment demonstrated in Sisney.152 In
Aguiar v. Recktenwald,153 the Third Circuit upheld a prison system deactivating an
inmate’s social media page.154 The petitioner’s sister ran his Facebook account while
he was in prison. 155 This was a violation of the Bureau of Prisons’ policy as well as
Facebook’s Terms and Conditions. 156 Applying Turner, the court found that even if
Aguiar had a constitutional interest in accessing his Facebook account, the regulation
was reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of the prison. 157 First,
the court found that the prison had a legitimate interest in preventing Aguiar from
unmonitored communication, and this was related to the security and order of the
facility.158 Second, he still had alternate means to exercise his rights as he retained
other forms of communication in prison. 159 Third, to allow prisoners to
communicate in such a way would impose a massive burden on prison officials to

149. See id. Special Parole Condition 84, the condition at issue, stated:
You shall not use or access social media sites, social networking sites, peer-to-peer networks,
or computer or cellular instant message systems; e.g. Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat,
Lync, Gmail, Yahoo, KIK messenger, Tumblr, etc. This would include any site which allows
the user to have the ability to navigate the internet undetected.
See id. at 957 (citing Manning Decl. ¶ 41, Ex. C at 4).
150. See id. at 960-61 (“In the present case, the court recognizes that the state has similar
interests in enforcing parole conditions that promote the goals of deterrence and public safety.
However, these interests do not justify the sweeping prohibitions detailed in Special Parole
Condition 84.”).
151. See id. at 966 (summarizing the outcome of the application for preliminary injunction).
152. See Sisney v. Kaemingk, 469 F. Supp. 3d 903, 917-19 (D.S.D. 2020) (finding the portion
of the policy that bans “simple nudity which has no component of being sexually explicit” to be
overbroad and not related to any legitimate penological interests); see also Aguiar v. Recktenwald,
649 F. App’x 293, 295 (3rd Cir. 2016) (upholding the prison’s deactivation of a prisoner’s social
media account).
153. 649 F. App’x at 295.
154. See id. at 295–96 (summarizing the analysis and holding of the court).
155. See id. at 295 (summarizing the situation from which the claim arose).
156. See id. (“Prison investigators discovered that Aguiar was using his sister to update his
Facebook account and to send messages to others on his behalf—a violation of Bureau of Prisons
policy and of Facebook's terms and conditions.”).
157. See Aguiar v. Recktenwald, 649 F. App’x 293, 295 (3rd Cir. 2016) (“Even if he enjoys
such an interest, we have no doubt that Defendants' decision to exclude Aguiar from this activity—
when his specific use violated BOP policies—was ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests,’ and thus constitutionally permissible.”) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.78, 89 (1987)).
158. See id. at 296 (applying the first factor of the Turner analysis).
159. See id. (“Secondly, despite the deactivation of his account, Aguiar still retained traditional
methods of communication, including phone calls, postal mail, and prison visitation.”).
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monitor such communications. 160 Finally, the only less restrictive alternative to
regulating this right would be to monitor these accounts, which the court believed
was an unfeasible burden on prison officials.161
IV. REAL INTERESTS OR JUST TROLLING: INMATES SHOULD BE ABLE TO
EXERCISE THESE PIVOTAL RIGHTS IN PRISON
While incarcerated individuals may lose certain rights in the name of
punishment, it is evident that First Amendment rights cannot be broadly limited just
because of conviction status.162 State punishment for penal infraction is justified in
many ways, and while the most cited goals are retribution, deterrence, and
rehabilitation, the modern focus is on the latter two. 163 Limits on First Amendment
rights and the ability to profit in prison seem to reinforce retributive and deterrent
goals, but do not comport with rehabilitation, especially in light of the recent
Supreme Court ruling in Packingham. 164 Additionally, the courts have evolved in their
understanding of the First Amendment, as exhibited in Packingham, one of the first
Supreme Court cases to discuss the First Amendment and the internet, and in cases
surrounding banned reading material in prisons.165 Yet, cases concerning social
media access in prison erroneously do not follow this zeitgeist.166 Further, while
social media access has been protected in sanction statuses tangential to
incarceration, prisoners, essentially with the same sanctioned-status, are kept from
social media because they are behind iron bars and cinder-blocked walls.167

160. See id. (applying the third factor of the Turner analysis). Even though the court
acknowledges this communication would be occurring through a proxy, the court still says that
prison officials would have to be apprised of it. See id.
161. See id. (applying the fourth factor of the Turner analysis).
162. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (1987) (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)).
The Turner court explained that “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates
from the protections of the Constitution.” Id.
163. See Joel Meyer, Reflections on Some Theories of Punishment, 59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE SCI. 595, 595 (1968) (introducing the societal needs for punishment and the goals
punishment aims to achieve); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (quoting Williams
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949)) (stating that while retribution is still an available objective,
it is not the dominant objective of punishment).
164. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017) (emphasizing the
benefits of social media).
165. See id. at 1736 (discussing the implications of failing to recognize the relationship between
the First Amendment and the internet); see also Sisney v. Kaemingk, 469 F. Supp. 3d 903, 918–19
(D.S.D. 2020) (holding that books need to be closely scrutinized to determine if they are disqualified
by prison censorship, rather than broadly).
166. See Aguiar, 649 F. App’x at 295 (holding that a prison’s broad ban on social media was
justified).
167. See, e.g., Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (2017) (holding that a North Carolina law
criminalizing registered sex offenders interacting with social media sites was a violation of the First
Amendment as social media is one of the most prevalent modern ways to express those rights);
Manning v. Powers, 281 F. Supp. 3d 953, 960-61 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that the plaintiff would
likely be successful in challenging a complete ban on interacting with social media sites in a parole
agreement on First Amendment grounds); Cohen v. Barr, 20 Civ. 5614 (AKH), 2020 WL 4250342,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2020) (ruling that a complete ban on interacting with the media as a
condition of an at-home prison stay was a violation of plaintiff’s first amendment rights).
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A. Retribution: As Outdated as MySpace
Criminal punishment has been grounded in the ideals of retribution, deterrence,
and rehabilitation to create society’s modern methods of enforcing conformity and
handling offenders.168 Time has created a significant dichotomy between what was
once acceptable in the name of punishment and what is now common practice. 169
This is especially true concerning retribution, a theme first identified in practices that
inflicted pain upon offenders in the name of revenge.170 The Supreme Court has
recognized that retribution is no longer a dominant motivation of the criminal justice
system, and it should not outweigh deterrence and rehabilitation. 171 As punishment
continues to evolve, as seen in other countries, modern practices focus on
rehabilitation and providing occupational training to incarcerated individuals in an
effort to reduce recidivism.172
Rehabilitation aims to return those who have committed criminal acts “to
society neither embittered nor resolved to get even for [their] degradation and
suffering, but possessing a new set of values and morals and a desire to contribute
to society.”173 This country’s criminal justice system is often criticized for releasing
incarcerated persons without any programs to help them reacclimate to society. 174
Policies preventing social media access in prison and the ability to profit from
published works are analogous to these shortfalls. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that social media presents the opportunity for criminals to make
something of their lives as they reacclimate to society.175 Additionally, connection
to family and friends is a pivotal factor in successful re-entry, and social media is a
key resource in fostering this connection, as seen in the pandemic. 176 It is irrelevant

168. See Meyer, supra note 163, at 595 n. 1 (defining punishment and what it has meant
historically to society).
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (outlining how a misguided weight is
placed on ensuring offenders receive the punishment they deserve, when deterrence should be
more heavily considered).
172. See Gordon B. Dahl & Magne Mogstad, The Benefits of Rehabilitative Incarceration, THE
REPORTER (March 2020), https://www.nber.org/reporter/2020number1/benefits-rehabilitativeincarceration [https://perma.cc/G7TE-8SYQ] (summarizing research on incarceration practices
in Norway and how they can be applicable for prison reform in the United States).
173. Meyer, supra note 163, at 597.
174. See, e.g., 10 Keys to Preparing Prisoners for Re-Entry, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & RECONCILIATION
[hereinafter
10
Keys],
http://restorativejustice.org/am-site/media/re-entry-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MZ2U-9AQF] (detailing how recidivism rates are high for ex-prisoners due to
a lack of preparation by prison systems).
175. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (“Even convicted
criminals—and in some instances especially convicted criminals—might receive legitimate benefits
from these means for access to the world of ideas, in particular if they seek to reform and to pursue
lawful and rewarding lives.”).
176. See, e.g., 10 Keys, supra note 174 (outlining how constructive relationships are pivotal for
successful re-entry); Beckley, supra note 16 (discussing how FaceTime is a pertinent resource in
connecting loved-ones in the pandemic, especially as they face death); Ferranti, supra note 31
(“Maintaining family ties can improve the likelihood of a successful reentry into the community,
thus reducing the potential for recidivism.”).
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whether this process begins during or after prison time; actually, rehabilitation and
re-acclimation efforts are most successful when they start at the onset of
incarceration. 177 Moreover, economic laws that aim to cover the costs of prisoners’
care inadvertently stifle First Amendment rights as they make it almost impossible
for prisoners to profit in the pursuit of literary success, even in an effort to provide
for their families.178 While modern Son of Sam laws appear more appropriate, as
they further efforts to repay victims, they must be closely monitored to ensure that
they don’t stifle First Amendment rights and comport with the holding in Simon &
Schuster.179
B.

Literature Receives a Status Update, but Social Media and Publishing Remain
Offline

Developments in prisoners’ access to literature demonstrate the legal system’s
modern understanding of the First Amendment and how it interacts with our penal
systems.180 Prison systems often succumb to public outcry prior to litigation when
access to any published material is overly regulated. 181 When these issues are
brought to court, as in Sisney, the restrictions are strictly scrutinized, overturned, and
must be replaced with narrower regulations that address the true penological
concerns behind them.182 Additionally, in Packingham, the Supreme Court
acknowledged this updated understanding of the First Amendment, carefully, yet
broadly, applying its protections to the internet. 183
If these same principles are applied to social media access, especially in the case
of Aguiar, it becomes apparent how inconsistent this ruling is, especially through the
lens of the Turner test. While the prison does have a legitimate interest in preventing
prisoners from partaking in unmonitored communications, the rationality of the
connection to a complete ban on social media access should be called into question,

177. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Introductory Handbook on The
Prevention of Recidivism and the Social Reintegration of Offenders 19 (2018),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/18-02303_ebook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5G9E-4QPP] (“Prison-based rehabilitation programmes are most effective
when they are based on a full diagnostic and individual assessment of the offender and his or her
situation. Such an assessment needs to occur as soon as possible after the offender’s admission to
an institution and, if at all possible, serve as the basis for a comprehensive and individualized
intervention plan. That way, programmes can focus on the dynamic risk factors and other
challenges faced by offenders in order to prepare them for their release and successful social
reintegration.”) (footnote omitted).
178. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 800.401–.406 (West 2020); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632a (McKinney 2020); Vargas, supra note 97, at 646–48 (describing potential problems of the amended
Son of Sam laws).
179. See Vargas, supra note 92, at 645–46 (explaining how the amendments changed the Son
of Sam laws).
180. See Sisney v. Kaemingk, 469 F. Supp. 3d 903, 918–19 (D.S.D. 2020) (holding that a prison
regulation banning publications with nudity that were not sexually explicit was overbroad and
unreasonable).
181. For a discussion of instances where regulations have been overturned in such a manner,
see supra note 22.
182. See Sisney, 469 F. Supp. 3d at 912 (discussing King and possible narrower regulations to
address penological concerns about prisoners and sexually explicit material).
183. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (emphasizing how the
current revolution in thought is occurring on the internet, and as the bounds of the medium expand,
the Court must be careful in providing no First Amendment protections to the forum).
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especially because of the broad scope of the prohibition. 184 In Sisney, the court found
the connection between banned content and penological interests irrational simply
because of an overinclusive definition of pornography that included general
nudity.185 The Supreme Court in Turner practically analyzed whether a marriage ban
would truly address love triangles and rivalry, ultimately finding they would exist in
prison with or without a marriage ceremony. 186
Furthermore, Packingham and Simon & Schuster shed light on justifiable state
interests, especially as they concern prisons and inmates posting on social media.
Simon & Schuster ultimately held that individuals should not be discouraged from
writing about their crimes, and Packingham further found that if a convict’s crime is
connected to social media use, the government may not ban lawful speech to prevent
potentially unlawful conduct.187 Packingham and Simon & Schuster invalidate
justifications for complete social media bans that are rooted in prison concerns for
potential to commit crimes online, or the prisoners’ criminal history. 188 Thus, it is
clear that the Third Circuit failed to consider whether the regulation is rationally
connected as the courts have done previously, and it only focused on if a relation
exists.189 The court did not give the requisite amount of weight to the interests
behind the regulation and the interests’ connection to what the regulation actually
achieved; thus, it has failed to follow the spirit of Turner, Sisney, Simon & Schuster, and
Packingham.
Continuing to analyze the Turner analysis in Aguiar, while Aguiar might retain
his phone, mail, and visitation privileges, these are not equivalent means of
expressing the First Amendment rights that social media provides.190 Social media
is instantaneous and accesses a large audience, as well as a myriad of resources

184. See Aguiar v. Recktenwald, 649 F. App’x 293, 296 (3rd Cir. 2016) (“As to the first factor,
prison officials facilitated the deactivation of Aguiar's account to prevent him from communicating,
through his sister, with unmonitored contacts—a legitimate interest related to the security and
order of the facility.”).
185. See Sisney, 469 F. Supp. 3d at 916 (“As for the factors underlying that ultimate Turner test,
the government objective underlying that portion of the regulations is legitimate and neutral, and
that portion of the regulations is rationally related to that government objective only with the
removal of nudity from the definitions of pornographic material and what is sexually explicit.”).
186. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 98–99 (1987) (holding that the regulation did not
logically connect to an intent to prevent love triangles and subsequent rivalries or a rehabilitative
goal).
187. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of The New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 119–20 (1991) (outlining how the state’s interest to disincentivize speech around crime
was content restrictive, a practice the Court had previously invalidated); see also Packingham, 137 S.
Ct. at 1738 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 235 (2002)).
188. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 119–21; see also Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737–38.
189. See, e.g., Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735; Turner, 482 U.S. at 97–98 (considering both
reasonability and logic into question when analyzing the rationality of the connection between the
regulation on marriage and the penological interests behind it); Aguiar, 649 F. App’x at 296 (“As to
the first factor, prison officials facilitated the deactivation of Aguiar's account to prevent him from
communicating, through his sister, with unmonitored contacts—a legitimate interest related to the
security and order of the facility.”); Sisney, 469 F. Supp. 3d at 916 (identifying rationality as a part
of analyzing the connection between a penological interest and a regulation motivated by such).
190. See Aguiar, 649 F. App’x at 296 (acknowledging that Aguiar still had traditional methods
of practicing his First Amendment rights).
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especially helpful to an incarcerated person’s ability to reacclimate into society, as
the Supreme Court acknowledged in Packingham.191 Further, the Supreme Court
stated that the internet provides a new space for revolutionary thought, and as such,
“[t]he forces and directions of the Internet are so new, so protean, and so far
reaching that courts must be conscious that what they say today might be obsolete
tomorrow.” 192 Thus, social media’s unique qualities, and characterization as the
arena for the modern revolution of thought, make it unlike the modes of
communication the Third Circuit considered similar.
Finally, to discuss both the burden placed on the prison and possible less
restrictive means in the Turner analysis, the Third Circuit found that monitoring such
activity would be too burdensome. 193 Yet, in many cases, prisoners do not post
content themselves, but communicate directions to a proxy through methods
already monitored by the prison, such as prison email systems and the traditional
forms of communication the court mentions above. 194 The prison system is already
monitoring the communications which are being used as direction for such posts. 195
Therefore, it would appear as if the communications are in fact being monitored. 196
Regardless, the court still treated the situation as if the prisoner was accessing social
media directly, without any oversight. 197 A further consideration is, if the proxy who
is posting violated some social media site community standard, the site has systems
in place to review and remedy any indiscretion. 198 Additionally, as of recent, prison
systems have demonstrated that close monitoring of social media accounts is
possible, especially in an effort to place pretrial detainees in segregation through the
Security Risk Group program assessment.199 Rulings such as Aguiar, that place an
emphasis on the possible burdens that the prison system could face, fail to account

191. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (summarizing the numerous functions social media can
be used for, as well as stating that cyberspace and social media are the most important forums for
expressing one’s First Amendment rights).
192. Id. at 1736.
193. See Aguiar, 649 F. App’x at 296 (“As to the third factor, permitting inmates to maintain
Facebook accounts through their agents, and to send unmonitored messages through these
accounts, would impose a massive burden on prison administrators to keep themselves apprised of
inmate communications. Finally, no other feasible less restrictive alternative exists—aside from
continuously monitoring Aguiar's account—that would allow prison administrators to maintain the
security of inmate communications while allowing Aguiar to maintain his account.”).
194. See id. at 295 (summarizing how prison investigators found out that Aguiar was managing
his account through his sister); see also Ken Armstrong, A Phone Call From Jail? Better Watch What
You
Say,
THE
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(Sept.
4,
2015,
7:15
AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/09/04/a-phone-call-from-jail-better-watch-what-yousay (asserting that prison telephone calls are often recorded and admissible at trial; Ferranti, supra
note 31 (summarizing how the TRULINCS secure prison email system works).
195. See Ferranti, supra note 31 (describing how prisons monitor the email system).
196. For a discussion on this monitoring, see supra note 31.
197. See Aguiar, 649 F. App’x at 295 (summarizing the behavior at issue); see also Ferranti, supra
note 31 (summarizing how prisoners access social media, as cell phones are contraband in prison).
198. See Aguiar, 649 F. App’x at 296 (acknowledging that Aguiar’s activities violated
Facebook’s terms and conditions).
199. See Benway v. Aldi, No. 3:19-cv-208 (VAB), 2020 WL 4433561, at *1 (D. Conn. July 30,
2020) (summarizing how a charged suspect was placed into a restrictive housing unit because of
Facebook posts that were deemed to be gang-related); see also Caves v. Payne, No. 3:20-cv-15
(KAD), 2020 WL 1676916, at *1 (D. Conn. April 6, 2020) (summarizing how a prisoner was placed
in segregation because Facebook filters, emojis, and comments from other users suggested gang
activity).
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for updated technology and the changing ideas of what access should be afforded to
inmates, again appearing obsolete, as discussed in Packingham.200
C. Prisoners Have Their Accounts Deleted, but Others Do Not
While the courts have been committed to overturning complete bans on social
media access for those on parole, home monitored incarceration, or criminals who
have served their time, the courts still leave inmates in the dark. 201 Michael Cohen
had pleaded guilty to tax evasion for concealing over $4 million from the IRS,
making false statements to a federally-insured bank, and paying off two women to
remain quiet in connection with a presidential campaign. 202 His furlough status did
not signal that he was less culpable than those still confined in correctional facilities,
but he received stronger First Amendment protection by the court system than other
inmates in prison.203 “Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates
from the protections of the Constitution.” 204 To rule that such a ban is still
applicable to and appropriate for prisoners is antithetical to the developing law. 205
Additionally, the support these regulations once had has been overturned and
eroded.206
V. RETWEET AND SHARE: ENSURING PRISONERS MAINTAIN THEIR RIGHTS
The First Amendment was not written for a chosen few.207 It was not intended
to apply to a population of only good persons or those who haven’t erred in our

200. Compare Aguiar, 649 F. App’x at 296 (explaining that permitting inmates to maintain
Facebook accounts and send unmonitored messages would “impose a massive burden”), with
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735-36 (2017) (emphasizing the importance of
considering the changing nature of the internet when analyzing First Amendment issues).
201. Compare Aguiar, 649 F. App’x at 295 (upholding the prison’s deactivation of a prisoner’s
social media account); with Cohen v. Barr, 20 Civ. 5614 (AKH), 2020 WL 4250342, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
July 23, 2020) (holding that a complete bar on interaction with the media in a Federal Location
Monitoring Agreement did not address the true penological interests of the government); and
Manning v. Powers, 281 F. Supp. 3d 953, 960-61 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that the plaintiff would
likely be successful in challenging a complete ban on interacting with social media sites in a parole
agreement on First Amendment grounds).
202. Press Release, Department of Justice, Michael Cohen Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal
Court to Eight Counts, Including Criminal Tax Evasion and Campaign Finance Violations (Aug.
21,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/michael-cohen-pleads-guilty-manhattanfederal-court-eight-counts-including-criminal-tax (describing the various charges Cohen pled guilty
to).
203. See id. (acknowledging Cohen’s culpability); Compare Cohen, 2020 WL 4250342, at *1
(granting Cohen’s motion for injunctive relief), with Aguiar, 649 F. App’x at 295-96 (allowing the
prison to deactivate the prisoner’s social media account).
204. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (reiterating the first principle in framing the
analysis of a prison regulation case).
205. See Packingham 137 S. Ct. at 1735–36 (explaining the importance of considering the
evolution of the Internet and social media when evaluating prisoners’ First Amendment rights).
206. See id.
207. See id. at 1735 (“A fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have
access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once
more.”).
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society.208 Its assurances provide protection for those who may not have chosen
what society views as the straight and narrow path to success.209 Its parameters
encompass everyone.210 To thwart its intentions by allowing it to apply to only those
who have complied with the penal code would deny the full intentions and scope of
its declarations upon society.211
To jeopardize the rights of a prisoner to speak out through prose or postings
on social media platforms chips away at the very essence of what the authors of the
constitution provided.212 Prison regulations need to evolve with the times--as they
have done repeatedly.213 Interactions with literature, social media, and an
individual’s own written works have a myriad of benefits for both current prisoners
and formerly imprisoned individuals. 214 “Even convicted criminals--and in some
instances especially convicted criminals--might receive legitimate benefits from these
means for access to the world of ideas, particularly if they seek to reform and to
pursue lawful and rewarding lives.”215 In an effort to rehabilitate this country’s
prison population of over two million individuals, social media and, generally,
opportunities for incarcerated persons to publish their thoughts, may offer pivotal
opportunities for successful re-acclimation and decreased recidivism.216 If prisoners
do not have access to these important forums to exercise free speech, they are not
only excluded from the possible benefit, but they may also be precluded from calling
attention to the systems they are subject to, especially in a time where the criminal
justice system is being scrutinized.

208. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates
from the protections of the Constitution.”).
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See Note, Prison Mail Censorship and the First Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 87, 111 (1971)
(asserting that mail prohibitions should not be based on the identity of the recipient, especially if it
is a prisoner).
212. See Packingham,137 S. Ct. at 1735 (emphasizing the fundamental principles of the First
Amendment).
213. See id. at 1736 (“While we now may be coming to the realization that the Cyber Age is a
revolution of historic proportions, we cannot appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential
to alter how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be. The forces and directions
of the Internet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts must be conscious that what
they say today might be obsolete tomorrow.”).
214. See, e.g., id. at 1737 (“By prohibiting sex offenders from using those websites, North
Carolina with one broad stroke bars access to what for many are the principal sources for knowing
current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square,
and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge.”); Ferranti, supra note
31 (“Maintaining family ties can improve the likelihood of a successful reentry into the community,
thus reducing the potential for recidivism.”).
215. Id. at 1737.
216. See, e.g., 10 Keys, supra note 174 (outlining key resources and programs that prisoners need
access to for successful re-entry into society, including vocational programs, treatment, and
transitional housing); Dahl & Mogstad, supra note 172 (describing how the opportunity to gain
employment decreases the likelihood of recidivism by 46%, yet inability to keep a job previously
held due to imprisonment leads to no change in employment or recidivism rates; Ferranti, supra
note 31 (stating that social media access helps maintain family ties, which improve the likelihood
of a successful reentry into the community, thus reducing the potential for recidivism). Packingham
emphasizes that social media, such as Linkedin, can help individuals get jobs or access to these
resources. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735.
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